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How do stakeholders react to Corporate Social Irresponsibility (CSiR)? What are
the emotional mechanisms and behavioral outcomes following CSiR perception? The
psychology of CSR literature has yet to address these important questions and has
largely considered CSR and CSiR as the opposite poles of the same continuum. In
contrast, we view CSR and CSiR as distinct constructs and theorize about the cognitive
(perceptual), emotional, and behavioral effects of CSiR activity on observers (i.e., primary
and secondary stakeholders) building on theories of intergroup perception. Specifically,
building on the Stereotype Content Model (SCM; Fiske et al., 2002) and the BIAS map
(i.e., Behaviors from Intergroup Affect and Stereotypes; Cuddy et al., 2007)—which
extends the SCM by predicting behavioral responses—we make predictions on potential
stakeholder reactions to CSiR focusing on two practice-relevant cases: (a) a typical
for-profit firm that engages in a CSiR activity, (b) an atypical admired firm that engages in
CSiR activity.
Keywords: Corporate Social Irresponsibility (CSiR), Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), stereotype content
model, stakeholders, psychology of CS(i)R
INTRODUCTION
While Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has received considerable attention (e.g., Sen et al.,
2016), the business world has been tarnished with numerous scandals and other irresponsible
behaviors, such as environmental pollution or abuses of human rights. These phenomena,
conceptualized collectively as Corporate Social Irresponsibility (CSiR), have received comparatively
little scholarly attention. Moreover, despite the fact that “individuals act based on perceptions, not
objective reality” (Wry, 2009, p. 156), only the emerging microfoundations perspective in CSR
(Rupp and Mallory, 2015) and isolated efforts in the CSiR literature (e.g., Lange and Washburn,
2012) take a micro-level view of the effects of CSR and CSiR on the observer of the firm.
Building on recent calls for more research on the micro-level mediating mechanisms that
translate stakeholders’ CSiR perceptions into outcomes (e.g., Glavas, 2016), we theorize about
the cognitive (perceptual), emotional, and behavioral effects of CSiR activity on observers. Thus,
we extend the psychology of corporate responsibility literature, which has largely focused on
CSR. In particular, we examine the perceptual, emotional, and behavioral effects of CSiR on
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stakeholders1, undertaken by two types of firms: (a) stereotypical
for-profit firms that are generally perceived as economically
competent but purely self-interested or (b) by admired firms,
such as VW, that are perceived as both economically competent
and socially responsible (communal). Motivated by the VW
software rigging scandal, we consider how such firms may be
affected by CSiR activity.
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS: FIRMS
AND THE SCM
Our theoretical model examines the effects of stakeholders’
perceptions of firms’ CSiR activities on their emotions and
behaviors toward the firm. Since firms are social evaluation
objects (Kervyn et al., 2012), we build our propositions on
the psychological study of social relations and, particularly,
on the validated, primal, and universal Stereotype Content
Model (SCM; Cuddy et al., 2008). The SCM suggests that the
perceptual aspect of stereotypes is based on two dimensions,
namely Communality2 and Competence (or being agentic; Bakan,
1966). Communality is understood as the alignment of the
intentions of the perceived to the interests of the perceiver and
competence as the ability to bring about desired events (Cuddy
et al., 2008). The stereotype content is reduced to a positioning
in four clusters within the two dimensional perceptual space of
communality and competence: high in both (HCHA)3, low in
both (LCLA), high communality low competence (HCLA), and
low communality high competence (LCHA). Empirical evidence,
moreover, positions the stereotyped predominately in the latter
two ambivalent clusters. For instance, men (Glick and Fiske,
1999), Jews (Glick, 2002), or professional women (Glick and
Fiske, 1996) are primarily perceived as LCHA, while the elderly
(Cuddy and Fiske, 2004) or traditional women (Eagly and
Mladinic, 1989) are perceived largely are HCLA.
The SCM further posits that perceivers are likely to experience
emotions that correspond to each of the four clusters. Specifically,
prior research has suggested that liking and respecting are
the affective signatures of communality and competence,
respectively (Fiske et al., 1999) and differ in their antecedents:
“...liking–disliking is a response reflecting personal interests
and preferences, such as fondness (loathing), attachment
(dissociation), enjoyment (aversion) [...] Respect–disrespect is
a response which reflects high regard of and deference to a
person” (Wojciszke et al., 2009, p. 39). These affective responses
originate from the structural relations between individuals or
groups (Glick and Fiske, 2001), as operationalized by their
interdependence (competitive vs. cooperative) and by the relative
status of the group (Fiske et al., 2002), respectively. For example,
1We develop our propositions without a particular class of stakeholders in mind.
Future work could refine our model by examining differentiating nuances between
specific observer classes (e.g., employees vs. customers).
2The term warmth has been originally used in the SCM nomenclature, but for
reasons of terminological clarity we use the term communal instead (see Abele and
Wojciszke, 2007). Indeed, Kervyn et al. (2012, p. 206) note that “...warmth as a trait
by itself is easily confused with the perceiver’s feelings of warmth.”
3We use “A” to denote the second dimension in the acronym, which stands for
agentic, since “C” would create obvious ambiguity.
individuals respect members of the high-status group but
dislike them in competition (Wojciszke et al., 2009), while they
disrespect low status-groups but like them in cooperation (Fiske
et al., 1999). To summarize, HCHA perceptions generate liking
and respecting, LCHA respecting and disliking, HCLA liking and
disrespecting, and LCLA disliking and disrespecting4.
The SCM is concerned with perceptions of people. However,
it has recently been applied to perceptions of firms and brands by
stakeholders such as consumers (Aaker et al., 2010, 2012; Kervyn
et al., 2012). Although a for-profit firm can, in principle, occupy
any cluster, there is evidence that such firms are stereotyped as
low in communality and high in competence. By manipulating
the “.com” and “org.” heuristics and measuring university and
national samples’ willingness to buy, Aaker et al. (2010) found
such stereotyping, which is not surprising since stereotypes
are heuristic categorizations (Fiske and Neuberg, 1990) and
the for-profit prefix supports a heuristic characterization of
low communality. Indeed, although the for-profit company
contributes to society by providing employment or meeting
consumer needs, societal contribution is not its primary concern
(Devinney, 2009). Moreover, the power-ridden, competitive
corporate context is likely to elicit perceptions of competence.
Based on the SCM and its extension, the BIAS Map (Cuddy
et al., 2007), in what follows we propose the perception-induced
behavioral impact of a firm’s CSiR on the generic perceiver. We
shall first consider the stereotypical LCHA firms and then firms
that occupy the HCHA “golden quadrant” (Aaker et al., 2012).
We focus on these two clusters because of the aforementioned
stereotype and because brand research indicates high scores in
the competence scale for all the brands studied (Kervyn et al.,
2012 Figure 3)5.
EMOTIONAL AND BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS
OF CSIR: THE CASE OF THE TYPICAL
FOR-PROFIT FIRM
CSiR relates to perceptions of moral transgression and third-
party injustice (Lange and Washburn, 2012), both of which
powerfully evoke anger. Consequently, CSiR is naturally related
to anger, an emotion that expresses moral outrage (Cuddy et al.,
2008). Indeed, Grappi et al. (2013) find that companies’ ethical
and social transgressions engender anger (also, Antonetti and
Maklan, 2016)6. Although anger does not appear in the SCM,
per se, one particularly interesting feature of the LCHA cluster
is that anger has been found to play a critical role for the
4The SCM, in its most sophisticated form, associates the four clusters with the
“signature emotions” of admiration, envy, pity, and contempt, respectively (Cuddy
et al., 2008). However, we adopt a more rudimentary approach because our focal
objects of perception are firms which cannot invoke complex emotions, such as
envy, to individuals.
5We believe that a large number of not-for-profit organizations, such as
governmental organizations, NGOs, and social enterprises would occupy the
remaining clusters. We view this as an important and natural extension to our
present work.
6CSiR may also impact on perceptions of the firm by intensifying the lack of
communality. However, since the effect will not change the cluster in which the
firm is positioned and since our predictions are cluster-based we ignore such effects
here.
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observers’ behavioral reactions toward the stereotyped. Such
stereotype-induced behaviors are predicted by the BIAS map
(Cuddy et al., 2007), which has extended the SCM in this
respect.
According to the BIAS map, behaviors are represented in
two dimensions, intensity and valence. Intensity is characterized
as either intense or mild and valence as facilitative or
harmful. The BIAS Map predicts, inter alia, that perceptions
induce specific combinations of dual behaviors, as mediated
by affective responses (i.e., liking and respect). In particular,
LCHA perceptions should induce mild facilitation or intense
harm, HCHA perceptions will induce mild or intense facilitation,
HCLA perceptions will induce intense facilitation or active harm,
and LCLA perceptions will induce mild or intense harm. For
firms, mild facilitation could amount to simply purchasing the
company’s products, while discrediting or suing the company
could amount to intense harm.
A stereotypical for-profit company, which is perceived as
LCHA, is disliked but respected and should, accordingly, expect
to be either mildly facilitated or intensely harmed. However,
the theoretically predicted intensely harmful behaviors were only
found to occur in the presence of an additional emotion, anger,
which fully mediates the causal link between perception, primary
emotion (respect and dislike), and behavior (Cuddy et al., 2007).
Thus, we posit (see Figure 1):
Proposition 1: CSiR activity, when committed by a firm perceived
as LCHA, such as a stereotypical for-profit firm, is likely to generate
anger which, in turn, is likely to generate intensively harmful
behaviors.
Given the pivotal role of anger in the generation of intensely
harmful behaviors, in order to understand the behavioral impact
of a CSiR activity by a typical for-profit firm we need to
consider the conditions under which CSiR may generate anger.
Developing a complete account of such conditions is outside
the scope of this article. However, Lange and Washburn (2012)
propose, inter alia, that the culpability of the corporation
generates attributions of CSiR.We focus here on culpability since
it is affected by causal attributions and attribution theory is an
important but relatively neglected theoretical mechanism in the
micro-CSR literature (Glavas, 2016). In particular, we highlight
controllability of the causes underlying the CSiR activity, defined
as observers’ perception that an actor (i.e., the LCHA firm)
can affect the causes underlying the activity. Indeed, anger is
posited as an attribution of blame (Averill, 1983) and attribution
theory predicts that controllability is strongly linked to anger
(Weiner, 1985).
Specifically, in the presence of low controllability attributions
we expect the effect of CSiR activity on anger to be weakened
but, nevertheless, retained. This is because an LCHA firm’s
intentions are stereotypically perceived as not aligned with
observers’ interests (Kervyn et al., 2012) and CSiR only serves
to confirm these perceptions, which raises doubt concerning
the firm’s apparent lack of control. On the other hand, when
attributions of controllability are relatively higher the effect is
straightforward: negative reactions are expected, as the literature
on individuals’ reactions to acts of injustice predicts (e.g., Miller,
2001). For example, SIEMENS settled a large number of cases
of bribery for an estimated e1.3 billion (Patterson, 2009),
but could be a “victim” of extortion or competitive pressure
within a corrupt institutional field or a “victimizer” who set
the corrupt rules (Galang, 2012). We expect the emotional
and behavioral reactions of stakeholders to vary substantially
depending on the extent of controllability they assign to the
firm.
We also expect stakeholders to perceive the firm as more
culpable whenever it is perceived as predisposed to irresponsible
behavior, that is, “to have a tendency to act in [an irresponsible]
way over time” (Lange and Washburn, 2012, p. 306). Thus:
P2
P1P1
Moderators
Perception of culpability (+)
o
o Low controllability ( - ) 
o High controllability (+)
Intense 
Harm
CSiR Activity Anger
FIGURE 1 | The impact of CSiR on stakeholders when the firm is perceived as LCHA.
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Proposition 2: Feelings of anger, toward for-profit organizations
stereotypically perceived as LCHA that engage in CSiR, are likely
to be increased the more the corporation is deemed culpable.
Culpability is more likely to be ascribed when the firm is predisposed
to irresponsible behavior or when the firm’s controllability of the
causes is perceived as high, and it is less likely if controllability is
perceived as low.
COGNITIVE, EMOTIONAL, AND
BEHAVIORAL EFFECTS OF CSiR: THE
CASE OF THE ADMIRED FIRM
The second situation of interest concerns admired companies
(Kervyn et al., 2012) that occupy the HCHA “golden quadrant”
(Aaker et al., 2012), despite the LCHA stereotype. The SCM and
the BIAS map, as applied herewith, predict that such companies
are expected to be respected and liked and to be either mildly
or intensely facilitated (see Figure 2). How will perceivers be
affected cognitively (perceptually), emotionally, and behaviorally
if such firms engage in CSiR?
There are two main possibilities: (a) the firm remains in the
same perceptual quadrant (albeit with its reputation dented) or
(b) the CSiR activity is potent enough to displace it within the
perceptual space to the stereotypical LCHA quadrant. We shall
consider both possibilities.
First, since, by supposition, the firm occupies the HCHA
quadrant, it is expected to act communally. CSiR is, therefore,
not only negative but also unexpected; conditions that increase
the salience of the activity. Even if the firm remains in the HCHA
cluster, the CSiR activity is likely to dent the liking that it enjoys
and, ultimately, the behavioral impact. In particular, since the
communality dimension has become salient, behavioral intensity
becomes more prominent (Cuddy et al., 2007) and, according to
the BIAS map, due to the negativity of the firm’s irresponsibility,
the facilitative behavioral response is more likely to bemild rather
intense. This effect resembles the “insurance-like property” of
CSR noted by Godfrey et al. (2009) who found that firms
engaging in CSR lost on average (one-third) less capitalization
than their counterparts not engaging in CSR. Investing in CSR
generates goodwill and moral capital which, in the presence of a
negative event, “...should reduce the overall severity of sanctions
by encouraging stakeholders to give the firm “the benefit of the
doubt”” (Godfrey et al., 2009, p. 428).
If, on the other hand, the firm returns to stereotypically low
communality ratings, then the behavioral responses are expected
to be quite adverse, as predicted earlier.
Proposition 3: CSiR activity, when committed by a firm that is
perceived as HCHA may either (a) fail to displace the firm from the
HCHA quadrant, in which case the firm is likely to experience mild
facilitation, mediated by decreased liking and respect, or (b) displace
the firm to the stereotypical LCHA quadrant, in which case the
firm is likely to experience intensively harmful observer behaviors,
mediated by respect, dislike, and anger.
Respect 
and Dislike
P3b
P3a
P3a
P3b
Conditions of Perceptual 
Displacement
Intensity of stereotype (+)
Irresponsibility 
communality congruence (+)
Dispositional attribution (+)
o Low controllability ( - ) 
o High controllability (+)
Intense 
Harm
CSiR Activity
Anger
Communal
(like)P4
Mild 
Facilitation
Admired Firm
Agentic/
Competent
(respect)
HCHALCHA
LCLA HCLA
Respect 
and Liking
Typical 
For-profit
Firm
P3b
P3
P3b
FIGURE 2 | The impact of CSiR on stakeholders when the firm is perceived as HCHA.
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It is, thus, important to identify conditions that trigger perceptual
displacement fromHCHA to LCHA. There are several conditions
that could drive such displacement and, although, it is outside the
scope of this article to theorize about them in detail, we briefly
discuss three prominent conditions.
The first condition is the intensity of the for-profit stereotype
within the industry: if perceivers firmly believe in it they
may assume that the admired company simply reverted to the
stereotypically expected behavior of for-profits. For instance,
such intensity could depend on geographical locality. Indeed,
according to a recent European Commission (2013) non-
Europeans are more positive about the overall influence of
companies on society. Therefore, it seems that in the EU (vs.,
for instance, Brazil) the LCHA stereotype is more entrenched,
which could result in construing the CSiR activity of an
admired company as a manifestation of its non-communal
nature.
The second condition concerns the alignment of the act
with the underlying dimension of the firm’s communality
rating. For instance, if a firm, such as VW (Hotten, 2015), is
an environmental champion in its industry an environmental
infraction, such as VW’s software rigging scandal, is likely to
affect it more than a taxation impropriety. That is because
observers will be more likely to characterize a company as
hypocritical when there are domain-specific inconsistencies
simply because comparisons are more fluent. Congruity theory
(Osgood and Tannenbaum, 1955) predicts that individuals
appreciate consistency between what they know and new
information. If there is inconsistency—which is easier to
diagnose in the case of domain specific communality and
irresponsibility, respectively—individuals will try to restore
balance by changing attitudes, which in our context may mean
displacing the firm to the LCHA quadrant. Our prediction also
has implications for the literature that examines the effects of
perceptual CSR fit on observer outcomes (e.g., Simmons and
Becker-Olsen, 2006), which relates to the extent to which the
cause has connections to the firm’s core business. Thus, while
CSR fit is reported to have positive effects (Simmons and Becker-
Olsen, 2006), once a firm engages in CSiR, CSR fit may backfire.
Finally, the third condition relates to the nature of the
causal attribution. In particular, if observers perceive the CSiR
as a signal of the firm’s core then they will attribute it to the
firm’s disposition which is likely to cause displacement toward
the LCHA quadrant in the perceptual space. Specifically, as in
proposition 2, if observers view the act as something that is
relatively not controlled by the company, such as unrealistically
harsh environmental legislation or industry-wide institutional
pressures, then the act will not be attributed to the firms’
core and perceptual displacement may be avoided. Conversely,
if the CSiR is perceived as relatively controllable, it may be
attributed to the firm’s core and displacement might not be
avoided.
Proposition 4: For-profit organizations perceived as HCHA that
engage in CSiR are more likely to be displaced toward the LCHA
quadrant if the LCHA stereotype is more entrenched within the
industry, if there is congruence between the irresponsible behavior
and the firm’s communality rating, and if the causes of the
irresponsible behavior are attributed to controllable factors.
CONCLUSION
The psychology of CSR literature has primarily focused on
companies doing good, largely assuming that CSR and CSiR
are the two polar opposites of the same construct. We argue
that these are distinct constructs that require separate theoretical
examination (for example, the same company might engage in
both CSR and CSiR; Kang et al., 2016). That said, we now
have some knowledge of how stakeholders react to CSR (Glavas,
2016), yet we know less about stakeholders’ reactions to CSiR.
Specifically, what are the emotional and behavioral outcomes
of CSiR perceptions for stereotypical firms (LCHA) and for
admired firms (HCHA)? We give some initial answers to these
questions and contribute to the psychology of CSiR by providing
a general socio-cognitive model of outcomes—a mediating
mechanism between the CSiR activity and its effects—that relies
on a validated and parsimonious yet universal model of social
perception. Clearly, there is more to follow, for instance: (a)
additional moderating factors may be considered, (b) since our
model is perceptual, looking at particular classes of observersmay
yield differential outcomes, and (c) will it be useful for a company
to rectify its reputational damage by engaging in CSR following
the exposure of its irresponsible behavior?
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